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FAMILY LAW-RELOCATION DISPUTES-FROM PARENT TO PAYCHECK:
THE DEMOTION OF THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT WITH THE CREATION OF
THE CUSTODIAL PARENT'S PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT TO RELOCATE.
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
As the mobility of American society has increased, courts across the
United States have been faced with a growing amount of relocation litiga-
tion.' Because of the competing interests of fathers, mothers, and children,
state courts have struggled to develop an appropriate legal standard applica-
ble to relocation disputes. 2 The courts have generally adopted one of four
approaches.3 First, some states follow the "real advantage" approach, an
approach requiring the custodial parent first to demonstrate a real advantage
to herself and her children before the court will consider a variety of fac-
tors.4 Second, some states recognize a presumptive right in the custodial
parent to relocate.5 Third, some states place on the custodial parent a burden
to prove that the move is in the child's best interests.6 Finally, some states
simply apply a "best interests of the child" standard. 7 Additionally, in re-
sponse to the relocation quagmire, the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers proposed the Model Relocation Act in 1997.8 The Model Reloca-
tion Act is a template of a relocation statute proposed to aid state legislative
bodies in drafting a statutory solution to the relocation problem.9
According to most family law practitioners, relocation litigation is one
of the most important topics in family law today.' ° Its importance derives
from the high financial and emotional costs that it imposes on the litigating
1. Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving Backward, 31 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 983, 984 (2000). "Relocation litigation" refers to the scenario that arises when
the custodial parent desires to move himself/herself and the children away from the noncus-
todial parent and the noncustodial parent objects. Id.
2. Steven Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to Custodial Parent Move-
Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 498 (1998).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 498-504.
5. Id. at 504-07.
6. Id. at 507-09.
7. Id. at 509-12.
8. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Proposed Model Relocation Act,
15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1 (1998). The Board of Governors of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) adopted the Proposed Model Relocation Act in
Cancun, Mexico, on March 9, 1997. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Terry, supra note 1, at 985.
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parties." Furthermore, relocation litigation impacts society because of the
effect it has on the children involved.'
2
This note explores the approach of the Arkansas courts to relocation
litigation through the examination of the 2003 Arkansas Supreme Court
opinion Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 13 a decision that attempted to clarify
the standards that govern relocation disputes in Arkansas courts. 14 The note
begins this examination with a historical-legal background of the topic,
moving from the first mention of the issue by the Arkansas Supreme Court
in 1916, through the Arkansas Court of Appeals's adoption of a new stan-
dard in 1994, and finally to the treatment of that standard in recent years by
the Arkansas Supreme Court. 15 From this historical context, the note ex-
plores the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning in the 2003 Hollandsworth
case. 16 Finally, the note discusses the significance and potential ramifica-
tions of that opinion.'
7
II. FACTS
Sheree Hollandsworth and Keith Knyzewski entered into marriage on
September 2, 1995, and divorced on October 10, 2000.18 Their marriage
yielded two children, Ethan, born February 1, 1996, and Katherine, born
February 17, 1998.19 The divorce decree granted Sheree primary custody of
the children.2° Subsequent to the divorce decree, the parents informally
agreed that each would have the children one-half of the time. 2' Both parties
lived in northwest Arkansas 22 as did both sets of their parents and extended
family.23 Pursuant to their agreement, Sheree and Keith divided the time
with the children evenly.24 They shared a mutual respect for the other's par-
11. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony T. Tanke, To Move or Not To Move: Psychologi-
cal and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 305, 306 (1996).
12. Id. at 307-12.
13. 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (2003) ("Hollandsworth If').
14. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 653.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 78 Ark. App. 190, 193, 79 S.W.3d 856, 858 (2002)
("Hollandsworth F').
19. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 858.
20. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 858.
21. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 858.
22. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 858.
23. Appellee's Testimony on Cross Examination, Abstract of Testimony at 14, Hol-
landsworth v. Knyzewski, 78 Ark. App. 190, 79 S.W.3d 856 (2002) (No. 02-720).
24. Appellant's Testimony on Direct Examination, Abstract of Testimony at 3, Hol-
landsworth v. Knyzewski, 78 Ark. App. 190, 79 S.W.3d 856 (2002) (No. 02-720). Sheree
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enting skills, agreeing at trial that they both had good parenting skills and
the abilities to meet the children's needs.
2 5
Sheree remarried on December 31, 2000.26 To be with her new hus-
band,27 Sheree desired to move herself and her children to Clarksville, Ten-
nessee, a distance of five hundred miles from Keith's residence. 28 In early
January of 2001, Sheree informed Keith that she was relocating to Clarks-
ville and intended to take their children with her.29 On January 11, 2001,
Keith filed a petition requesting that the court prohibit Sheree's relocation
with the children to Tennessee and further requesting that the court award
him primary custody of the children, arguing that Sheree's relocation would
constitute a material change in circumstances warranting custody modifica-
tion.30
The trial court ruled in favor of Keith, denying Sheree's petition to re-
locate and granting Keith's petition to modify custody.31 The trial court
analogized the facts of this case to those presented in Hickmon v. Hickmon
32
and found that Sheree, as custodial parent, had the burden under a Staab
33
analysis to show a "real advantage" to her and to the children for the pro-
posed move from northwest Arkansas to Tennessee. 34 The trial court con-
cluded that Sheree had failed to meet that burden.35 The court then exam-
ined the facts of the case under the factors of the Staab analysis, 36 a frame-
work of factors used to make relocation determinations.37 The court found
that neither party had improper motives and that Sheree would comply with
visitation orders if the court granted her relocation request. 38 The trial court
had the children on Monday afternoons, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, and Keith
had them on Monday evenings, Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays. Id.
25. Hollandsworth I, 78 Ark. App. at 194, 79 S.W.3d at 859.
26. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. 470, 473, 109 S.W.3d 653, 655 (2003).
27. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 655. Sheree's new husband, Brian Hollandsworth, was a corporal
in the United States Army stationed in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and was living in Clarks-
ville, Tennessee. Id.
28. Id. at 486, 109 S.W.3d at 664.
29. Id. at 473, 109 S.W.3d at 655.
30. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 655.
31. Hollandsworth I, 78 Ark. App. 190, 194, 79 S.W.3d 856, 859 (2002).
32. 70 Ark. App. 438, 444, 19 S.W.3d 624, 630 (2000). The Hickmon court did not find
the situation of a new husband/stepfather who provided stability and income for the child
sufficient to warrant relocation. Id. at 445, 19 S.W.3d at 629. That court denied the move of
the children to Arizona, concluding that there was no way to substitute the long distance
visitation for the relationship the children had with their father in Arkansas. Id., 19 S.W.3d at
627.
33. Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 868 S.W.2d 517 (1994).
34. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. at 474, 109 S.W.3d at 656.
35. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 656.
36. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 656.
37. See infra Part 1II.D.
38. Hollandsworth II, 353 Ark. at 474, 109 S.W.3d at 656.
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went on to hold, however, that the proposed relocation was not in the best
interests of the children because it would disrupt the relationship between
the children and their father, Keith.3 9 The court also found that the move
would disrupt the strong family ties the children had established with their
extended family in northwest Arkansas. 40 For these reasons, the trial court
ruled in favor of Keith.4'
Sheree appealed, and Divisions III and IV of the Arkansas Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's rulings in a decision that included five
concurrences and five dissents.42 The appellate court held that the trial court
erred in its finding that Sheree had not proved a "real advantage" to the new
family unit.43 Sheree argued, and the appellate court agreed, that the advan-
tages of a two-parent home and the financial advantages of her new hus-
band's career amounted to the requisite advantage the court required Sheree
to prove.44 The appellate court then noted that the trial court was correct in
finding some advantages to the move under the factors of the Staab analy-
sis. 45 The appellate court further stated that those advantages alone might be
significant enough to support the relocation.46 The Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals then reversed the trial court's ruling, concluding that the trial court
clearly erred in denying Sheree's petition to relocate and in granting Keith's
petition to change custody.47 Keith Knyzewski appealed, and the Arkansas
Supreme Court granted his petition.48
III. BACKGROUND
The examination of relocation law in Arkansas begins with the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court's first mention of the issue in 1916. 49 This section then
provides an overview of the two standards that governed Arkansas reloca-
tion disputes during the early to middle part of the twentieth century.50 The
section then moves to an examination of the legal standard adopted by the
39. 'Id., 109 S.W.3d at 656.
40. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 656.
41. Hollandsworth 1, 78 Ark. App. 190, 194, 79 S.W.3d 856, 859 (2002).
42. Id. at 190-221, 79 S.W.3d at 856-78.
43. Id. at 196, 79 S.W.3d at 860.
44. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 860.
45. Id. at 197, 79 S.W.3d at 860-61.
46. Id. at 197, 79 S.W.3d at 861.
47. Hollandsworth 1, 78 Ark. App. at 196, 79 S.W.3d at 861.
48. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. 470, 474, 109 S.W.3d 653, 656 (2003).
49. See infra Part III.A.
50. See infra Part 11.A-C.
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Arkansas Court of Appeals in 1994. 51 Finally, the section explores the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court's recent treatment of relocation disputes.
A. Two Standards: A Material Change of Circumstances and the Tender
Years Doctrine
At the beginning of the twentieth century, relocation disputes mani-
fested themselves in child-custody modification petitions in which one par-
ent would file a child-custody modification petition either to keep the child
from moving away from him/her or to be able to move the child with
him/her.53 The Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed a child-custody
modification request motivated by a parent's desired relocation of the child
in the 1916 decision Weatherton v. Taylor.54 In that opinion, the court relied
on a 1901 Washington case, Koontz v. Koontz,55 and established what would
come to be known as the "material change of circumstances" standard.56
The court held that a court cannot modify custody absent some proof show-
ing a change in circumstances from those that existed at the time of the
original custody order, implying that absent such proof the custodial parent
can move wherever he or she desires.57 The court, however, put forth no
bright line rule to use when determining if the circumstances have changed
enough to warrant custody modification; it only listed some possible exam-
ples.58
In addition to the "material change" doctrine, the court also came to
rely on the "tender years" doctrine in adjudicating child-custody modifica-
tion petitions motivated by the relocation of the custodial parent.59 The
"tender years" doctrine rested upon the premise that young children need to
be with their mother until they have grown out of the tender years. 60 This
doctrine proved to be a successful tool for mothers litigating custody modi-
fication cases, even resulting in the 1948 Arkansas Supreme Court decision
51. See infra Part 1II.D.
52. See infra Part III.E.
53. See discussion infra Part II1.A.
54. 124 Ark. 580, 583, 187 S.W. 450, 452 (1916) ("There has been no decision of this
court on the precise point .... ").
55. Koontz v. Koontz, 65 P. 546, 548 (Wash. 1901).
56. Weatherton, 124 Ark. at 584, 187 S.W. at 452 (citing Koontz, 65 P. at 548) (finding
that a child-custody decree is conclusive upon all other courts unless there has been a mate-
rial change in circumstances).
57. Id. at581, 187 S.W. at451.
58. Id., 187 S.W. at 451 ("The parent having the custody of the children may marry;
may become poor and unable properly to maintain and educate them; may become vicious
and morally unfit to have the control of the children.").
59. Gibson v. Gibson, 156 Ark. 30, 33, 245 S.W. 32, 33 (1922) (holding that because of
their young age, the children should have a mother's care and attention).
60. Riddle v. Riddle, 28 Ark. App. 344, 347, 775 S.W.2d 513, 516 (1989).
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Nutt v. Nutt,61 in which the court changed custody from the custodial father
to the noncustodial mother.62 The court reasoned that because the mother
was moving as far away as New York City, the young child, in the midst of
her tender years, should not be that far from her mother.
63
Subsequent to the development and application of the "material change
of circumstances" and "tender years" doctrines, the Arkansas Supreme
Court began to consider the rights of both parents. 64 In the 1952 Sage v.
Sage65 decision, the Arkansas court granted custody to the father when the
custodial mother decided to move out of Arkansas, partly on the grounds
that the proposed move would interfere with the noncustodial father's right
to visitation.66 Two years later, however, in the largely cited 1954 Antonacci
v. Antonacct 7 opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court emphasized the right of
the custodial parent who desires to move out of the state, noting that the
court would not require that parent to be a "prisoner" of the state.68
At this point in the court's history, the Arkansas Supreme Court ap-
plied child-custody modification standards to relocation disputes, thereby
implying that the burden of proof in relocation disputes was the same as the
burden of proof in child-custody modification cases: requiring the noncus-
61. 214 Ark. 24, 33, 214 S.W.2d 366, 371 (1948).
62. Id. at 25, 33,214 S.W.2d at 367, 371.
63. Id. at 33, 214 S.W.2d at 371. While the court's holding in this case appears quite
strange, the facts of this case are even stranger, including a series of parental attempts to
"steal" the child away from the other parent. Id. at 25-29, 214 S.W.2d at 367-71. The mother
first moved to New York with the child while the father was serving in the military overseas.
Id. at 25-26, 214 S.W.2d at 367. The father then went to New York and, under the auspices
of an afternoon visit to the zoo, he left New York with the child and returned to Arkansas. Id.
at 27, 214 S.W.2d at 367. The mother then attempted to steal the child back from the father's
parents, resulting in a boxing match with the child's grandfather. Id. at 29, 214 S.W.2d at
368. A Chancellor then awarded the father custody. Id., 214 S.W.2d at 369. Ultimately, the
Arkansas Supreme Court found that although the actions of both parents were contemptible,
the mother had never abandoned the child but instead had acted frantically to get custody of
the child and so, in light of the child's tender age, the child should be with her mother. Id. at
33, 214 S.W.2d at 371.
64. See discussion infra Part I.A.
65. 219 Ark. 853, 245 S.W.2d 398 (1952).
66. Id. at 857, 245 S.W.2d at 400 (holding that by removing the children from the state
without permission, the mother had deprived the father of his natural and legal rights).
67. 222 Ark. 881,263 S.W.2d 484 (1954).
68. Id. at 883, 263 S.W.2d at 485-86 ("We do not think that the Chancellor erred in
refusing to require appellee to remain somewhat a prisoner in Arkansas because of the unfor-
tunate divorce proceeding."). The facts in this case were not representative of a typical relo-
cation case in that the custodial parent and child in this case had actually established a home
in California following the divorce without objection and had employment in California. Id.
at 882, 263 S.W.2d at 485. The custodial parent briefly returned to Arkansas, whereupon the
father instituted a proceeding for change of custody and she was therefore restrained from
returning with the child to their already established home in California. Id., 263 S.W.2d at
485.
[Vol. 26
RELOCATION DISPUTES
todial parent to show that relocation is a "material change in circum-
stances., 69 A petition for child-custody modification, therefore, was the only
legal option the noncustodial parent could exercise to prevent the custodial
parent's relocation with the child (although the noncustodial mother could
also utilize the "tender years" doctrine under certain circumstances).70
B. The Ising Holding and the Years that Follow
The Arkansas Supreme Court attempted to clarify relocation law in its
1960 Ising v. Ward7' decision, holding that "the parent having custody of a
child is ordinarily entitled to move to another state and to take the child to
the new domicile." 72 The court also reiterated its previously stated holding
in Antonacci that the court would not require the custodial parent to remain
a "prisoner" in the state.73 The decision was also motivated in part by the
"tender years" doctrine.74
Although the Ising holding seemed to indicate a move towards a pre-
sumption in favor of custodial parents, the three dissenters recognized that
the obligations of parenthood might trump some individual rights of the
custodial parent.75 Eight years later in Walter v. Holman,76 the Arkansas
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Ising holding, restating that the custodial
parent is entitled to move to another state with the child. 77 The Walter deci-
sion, however, not only incorporated the majority holding from Ising but
also borrowed an argument from the Ising dissent concerning the obliga-
tions of parenthood, indicating that the court was struggling to find a stan-
dard that would provide a fair balance of the competing interests in a reloca-
tion dispute.78
69. See discussion supra Part II.A.
70. See discussion supra Part III.A.
71. 231 Ark. 767, 332 S.W.2d 495 (1960).
72. Id. at 768, 332 S.W.2d at 495.
73. Id., 332 S.W.2d at 495 (citing Antonacci, 222 Ark. at 881, 263 S.W.2d at 484).
74. Id. at 770, 332 S.W.2d at 497 (commenting that "the normal love of a parent, espe-
cially of a mother, for her child provides the best possible assurance that the infant will not
be needlessly exposed to danger").
75. Id. at 771, 332 S.W.2d at 497 (McFaddin, J., dissenting) (stating that, "the mother's
first duty is to her child .... The obligations of her parenthood should be held to impose a
superior duty on the mother.").
76. 245 Ark. 173, 431 S.W.2d 468 (1968).
77. Id. at 177, 431 S.W.2d at 471 (citing Ward, 231 Ark. at 767, 332 S.W.2d at 495).
78. Id. at 178, 431 S.W.2d at 471. The majority acknowledged the fact that it will be
necessary for at least one parent to forfeit some individual rights to the companionship of
their children when a court grants a divorce decree. Id., 431 S.W.2d at 471.
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
C. Don't Try a Little Tenderness
The next significant contribution to relocation law came with the abol-
ishment of the "tender years" doctrine by both statute79 and judicial de-
cree. 80 With the abolition, the Arkansas courts knew that they could not
consider the gender of the litigating parties in resolution of relocation dis-
putes. 8' At this point in the court's history, therefore, family law practitio-
ners and domestic relations courts were left with the Ising holding and the
"material change of circumstances" standard as guideposts on the road to
relocation dispute resolution.82
D. The Need for a Clearer Standard: The Arkansas Court of Appeals
Takes a Staab at It
In 1994 the Arkansas Court of Appeals issued the Staab v. Hurst83 en
banc ruling that provided the courts with an analytical framework within
which relocation disputes could be resolved, independent of the standards
that govern child-custody modification.
84
In Staab, the custodial mother desired to move from Arkansas to Texas
with her fifteen month-old daughter.85 The daughter's father opposed the
move, arguing that it would effectively be a denial of his visitation rights
because of the increased geographical distance.
86
The Staab court recognized that the Arkansas Supreme Court had said
little since holding in Ising that "the parent having custody of a child is or-
dinarily entitled to move to another state and to take the child to the new
domicile. 87 The Arkansas Court of Appeals found that the standard must be
more specific to relocation disputes and that "the determination of a child's
best interests cannot be made in a vacuum." 88 Furthermore, the appellate
court recognized that the standards that govern relocation disputes are dis-
tinguishable from those that govern child-custody cases and visitation
cases.
89
79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(LEXIS Supp. 2003).
80. Riddle v. Riddle, 28 Ark. App. 344, 347, 775 S.W.2d 513, 516 (1989).
81. Id., 775 S.W.2d at 516.
82. See discussion supra Part I1I.A-C.
83. 44 Ark. App. 128, 868 S.W.2d 517 (1994).
84. Id. at 133, 868 S.W.2d at 519.
85. Id. at 130, 868 S.W.2d at 517.
86. Id., 868 S.W.2d at 517-18.
87. Id. at 132-33, 868 S.W.2d at 519 (citing Ising v. Ward, 231 Ark. 767, 332 S.W.2d
495 (1960)).
88. Id. at 133, 868 S.W.2d at 519.
89. Staab, 44 Ark. App. at 133, 868 S.W.2d at 519.
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The Staab court then established a two-prong standard for relocation
dispute resolution modeled after those set forth in the New Jersey case
D 'Onofrio v. D 'Onofrio,90 the leading relocation case at the time.91 First, the
Arkansas Court of Appeals held that if the custodial parent seeks to move
the child to a place that is so geographically distant that it would render
weekly visitation impractical, the custodial parent should have the threshold
burden of proving that the move will result in some "real advantage" to the
family unit.92 Second, the court held that once the custodial parent has met
this threshold burden of proving a "real advantage," the court should then
consider a number of factors in deciding whether to allow the custodial par-
ent to relocate with the child.93 The factors include: (1) the prospective ad-
vantages of the move in terms of its likely capacity for improving the gen-
eral quality of life for both the custodial parent and the children; (2) the
integrity of the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move in order
to determine whether the removal is inspired primarily by the desire to de-
feat or frustrate visitation by the non-custodial parent; (3) whether the cus-
todial parent is likely to comply with substitute visitation orders; (4) the
integrity of the non-custodial parent's motives in resisting the removal; and
(5) whether, if the court allows the removal, there will be a realistic oppor-
tunity for visitation in lieu of the weekly pattern that can provide an ade-
quate basis for preserving and fostering the parent relationship with the
noncustodial parent.94
The Court of Appeals of Arkansas consistently followed Staab.95 For
example, in Wilson v. Wilson,96 five years after Staab, the custodial mother
desired to relocate with her children to California, and the noncustodial fa-
ther objected.97 In application of Staab, the court held that the custodial par-
ent bears the threshold burden to prove some advantage to the family unit.98
Finding that the custodial mother was found to have met that threshold, the
court then employed the Staab factors. 99 In illustration of how the applica-
tion of these factors worked, the Wilson court first found that the custodial
parent desired to relocate for employment purposes (purposes that would
enhance the financial position of the custodial parent's life and the lives of
90. Id. at 134, 868 S.W.2d at 520 (citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
91. Id. at 134, 868 S.W.2d at 520.
92. Id., 868 S.W.2d at 520.
93. Id., 868 S.W.2d at 520.
94. Id., 868 S.W.2d at 520.
95. See discussion infra Part III.D.
96. 67 Ark. App. 48, 52, 991 S.W.2d 647, 649 (1999).
97. Id. at 52, 991 S.W.2d at 649.
98. Id., 991 S.W.2d at 649.
99. Id. at 52-53, 991 S.W.2d at 650.
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the children). 100 Second, the court found that the custodial parent's motive
in seeking to relocate to California was not an underhanded attempt to im-
pede the noncustodial parent's visitation with the children.10' In application
of the third factor, the decision stated that the custodial parent would not
interfere with future visitation rights.10 2 Fourth, it was found that the non-
custodial parent's motive in resisting the removal was questionable. 0 3 Fifth,
the court concluded that the visitation schedule could be modified so as to
preserve and foster the parental relationship between the children and the
noncustodial parent. 10 4 The court then affirmed the lower court's decision
and allowed the custodial parent to relocate to California with the chil-
dren.'o5
In Hickmon v. Hickmon, 0 6 decided in 2000, the Arkansas Court of
Appeals again applied Staab.10 7 This time, however, the court prohibited the
custodial parent's move with the children from Arkansas to Arizona, finding
that--in light of the noncustodial parent's high level of involvement in the
child's life-the custodial parent did not meet the threshold burden of prov-
ing some "real advantage" to the family unit.00
In another application of the Staab analysis, the Arkansas Court of Ap-
peals has allowed relocation from Fayetteville, Arkansas, to El Dorado,
Arkansas, to allow the custodial parent to take advantage of a job opportu-
nity.109 Additionally, the court allowed a custodial parent to move from Ar-
kansas to Florida because the custodial parent had a job opportunity in Flor-
ida and would be near his mother." 0 In another application of Staab, the
court allowed the custodial parent to move from Arkansas to Texas because
the custodial parent had found a better paying job with less travel.' 1 The
Arkansas Court of Appeals has also denied relocation under Staab when, for
example, the custodial parent's motive lacked integrity and the evidence
supported a finding that the custodial parent would not comply with visita-
tion orders.' 12
Staab provided relocation disputes with their own standards independ-
ent of those that govern child-custody cases, and the Arkansas Court of Ap-
100. Id., 991 S.W.2d at 650.
101. Id. at 53, 991 S.W.2d at 650.
102. Wilson, 67 Ark. App. at 53, 991 S.W.2d at 650.
103. Id. at 54, 991 S.W.2d at 650.
104. Id., 991 S.W.2d at 650.
105. Id., 991 S.W.2d at 650.
106. 70 Ark. App. 438, 19 S.W.3d 624 (2000).
107. Id. at 445, 19 S.W.3d at 629.
108. Id., 19 S.W.3d at 629.
109. Hass v. Hass, 74 Ark. App. 49, 44 S.W.3d 773 (2001).
110. Wagner v. Wagner, 74 Ark. App. 135, 45 S.W.3d 852 (2001).
111. Friedrich v. Bevis, 69 Ark. App. 56, 9 S.W.3d 556 (2000).
112. Deluca v. Stapleton, 79 Ark. App. 138, 84 S.W.3d 892 (2002).
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peals has explicitly recognized that independence as recent as 2002.1 13 The
appellate court has also made it clear that the Staab analysis has no place in
a change of custody case, conversely intimating that a child-custody analy-
sis has no place in relocation disputes.' 4
E. The Arkansas Supreme Court's Avoidance of the Staab Approach
Although the Arkansas Court of Appeals has been faithful to the new
standards set forth in Staab, the Arkansas Supreme Court has proved to be
less receptive to the idea of treating relocation disputes as an issue apart
from child-custody issues. l l5 In the 1996 Jones v. Jones116 decision--two
years after the Court of Appeals decided Staab-the Arkansas Supreme
Court decided a child-custody modification petition filed by the noncusto-
dial father to keep the custodial mother from relocating with the child from
Conway to Little Rock." 7 In addressing what was practically a relocation
case, the Jones court did not analyze the move under Staab but instead ap-
plied the child-custody modification standard-a "material change in cir-
cumstances"-to resolve all facets of the case, including the relocation."
18
The court reiterated the standard that governed child-custody modification
cases, stating "the party seeking modification of the child-custody order has
the burden of showing a material change of circumstances.""19
The court did acknowledge Staab in 2002 but again refused to apply it
in Lewellyn v. Lewellyn. 120 In that case, the custodial parent (mother) sought
permission-despite a do-not-relocate provision in the divorce decree--to
relocate with the children to Fayetteville, Arkansas, from Russellville, Ar-
kansas.'12 The father counterclaimed asking for sole custody of the chil-
l 13. Vo v. Vo, 78 Ark. App. 134, 141, 79 S.W.3d 388, 392 (2002). The court recognized
that the standard governing a petition to relocate is different from the standard governing
custody changes. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 392.
114. See Riley v. Riley, 45 Ark. App. 165, 168-69, 873 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1994) ("[T]he
holding in Staab has no relevance in a change of custody case. There was no petition by the
non-custodial parent for a change of custody [in Staab]. The sole issue was whether the
custodial parent's petition to move from Arkansas with the minor child should be granted.").
115. See discussion infra Part III.E.
116. 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996).
117. Id. at 484, 931 S.W.2d at 768. The distance from Conway to Little Rock is ap-
proximately twenty-five miles. RAND MCNALLY, THE 2004 ROAD ATLAS: UNITED STATES,
CANADA, AND MEXICO 10 (Rand McNally & Company 2004).
118. Jones, 326 Ark. at 487-91, 931 S.W.2d at 770-72.
119. Id., 931 S.W.2d at 770-72.
120. Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 93 S.W.3d 681 (2002).
121. Id. at 349-50, 93 S.W.3d at 682-83. The distance from Fayetteville, Arkansas, to
Russellville, Arkansas, is approximately one hundred ten miles. RAND MCNALLY, supra note
117, at 10.
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dren. 122 The trial court analyzed the case as a change-of-custody case and
granted the father sole custody. 123 The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded the case, stating that the case was not as a change-of-custody case
but a relocation case and should therefore be evaluated under the factors
adopted in Staab.124
The Arkansas Supreme Court then reviewed the case de novo.125 Upon
review, the court used the "material change in circumstances" standard in-
stead of the Staab standard as was explicitly suggested by the Court of Ap-
peals.126 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that Staab was irrelevant.127 The
Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished Lewellyn from Staab, explaining
that Staab was irrelevant because it only applies when the facts of the case
indicate that relocation might make visitation impossible and, in this case,
visitation was not made impossible. 28 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court
was able to avoid Staab by strictly applying it only to the extreme circum-
stances where visitation is deemed to have been made impossible by the
geographic distance involved in the move. 1
29
In 2003, Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski130 presented the Arkansas Su-
preme Court with another opportunity to address Staab and Arkansas relo-
cation law.131 The Arkansas Supreme Court accepted that opportunity, cit-
ing confusion about relocation law throughout the bench, bar, and parties.
32
IV. REASONING
In Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 133 the Arkansas Supreme Court re-
jected the use of the relocation dispute standard previously espoused by the
Arkansas Court of Appeals in Staab. 134 The court, instead, announced a
presumption in favor of relocation for custodial parents and placed the bur-
den to rebut that presumption on the noncustodial parent. 135 The court also
held that "[t]he custodial parent no longer has the responsibility to prove a
122. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. at 350, 93 S.W.3d at 683.
123. Id. at 353, 93 S.W.3d at 685. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interest
of the children to grant the father custody because a relocation to a different area would be
traumatic for the children. Id., 93 S.W.3d at 685.
124. Id., 93 S.W.3d at 685.
125. Id. at 354, 93 S.W.3d at 685.
126. Id. at 355-56, 93 S.W.3d at 686-87.
127. Id. at 357, 93 S.W.3d at 688.
128. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. at 357, 93 S.W.3d at 688.
129. Id., 93 S.W.3d at 688.
130. 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (2003).
131. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 653.
132. Id. at 476, 109 S.W.3d at 657.
133. Id. at 470, 109 S.W.3d at 657.
134. Id. at 485, 109 S.W.3d at 663.
135. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
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real advantage to herself or himself and to the children in relocating."'' 36
Additionally, the decision announced that relocation alone does not consti-
tute a material change of circumstances. 
137
In support of it's holding, the court provided a brief discussion on the
mobility of modem society.' 38 The court then conducted a cursory overview
of the New Jersey courts' approach to relocation disputes.' 39 Following the
New Jersey analysis, the court performed an examination of eight other
states and their approaches to relocation disputes. 40 The court then shifted
its analysis to the Arkansas cases and declined to adopt or apply the Staab
criteria.141 In rejection of Staab and adoption of a new mode of analysis, the
court propounded four contentions: (1) modem society has attained a degree
of mobility such that no move within the United States would make visita-
tion impossible; (2) subsequent New Jersey cases have largely modified
D 'Onofrio, and, therefore, it is no longer a solid foundation upon which to
base Arkansas relocation law; (3) there is a current trend to loosen the bur-
dens of the custodial parent desiring to relocate; and (4) the Staab analysis
is inconsistent with Arkansas precedent. 142
A. Mobility of Modern Society
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled in Lewellyn that Staab only applies
when the relocation would render visitation impossible or impractical., 43 In
Hollandsworth II, therefore, the court began its analysis by discussing the
mobility of modem American society to suggest that with the increased
mobility of the United States population, no distance of relocation would
render visitation impractical or impossible. 44 The court found that one out
of every five Americans changes his or her residence each year and that
within four years of a divorce, one-fourth of all custodial mothers will move
to a new location. 45 The opinion quoted the finding in the New Jersey case
136. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. at 476, 109 S.W.3d at 657.
137. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657.
138. Id. at 476-84, 109 S.W.3d at 657-63.
139. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657-63. The Hollandsworth H decision rejected the Arkansas
Court of Appeals' Staab analysis. Id. at 484, 109 S.W.3d at 663. The Staab analysis relied
heavily upon the 1976 New Jersey case, D'Onofrio; therefore, in rejection of Staab, the
Arkansas Supreme Court examined New Jersey law as it has evolved since the 1976 case of
D'Onofrio. Id. at 476-84, 109 S.W.3d at 657-63.
140. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657-63. The court examined Minnesota, Tennessee, New York,
California, Colorado, Texas, North Carolina, and Wyoming. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657-63.
141. d. at 483-86, 109 S.W.3d at 662-64.
142. Hollandsworth II, 353 Ark. at 476-84, 109 S.W.3d at 657-64.
143. Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 354, 93 S.W.3d 681, 688 (2002).
144. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. at 476, 109 S.W.3d at 657.
145. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657 (citing Chris Ford, Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent
Developments anda Modelfor Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (1997)).
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Baures v. Lewis146 that many courts have recently "reassessed the burden
cast on custodial parents who desire to relocate with their children [and]
reasons for the change include geographic mobility of the United States
population . . . .,,14' After referring to these few findings, the court stated,
without further elaboration, that American society has become more mobile,
thereby implying that the modem mobility of society is of such an advanced
degree that no distance of relocation would render visitation impractical and
therefore, according to the court, the Staab analysis would never be use-
ful.
1 48
B. The New Jersey Analysis
The Arkansas Supreme Court then turned its analysis to New Jersey
law.149 The standard adopted in Staab was largely based on the New Jersey
case D 'Onofrio.150 To bolster its arguments that Staab is unfair to custodial
parents and that D 'Onofrio is no longer a reliable foundation for relocation
law, the Arkansas Supreme Court examined New Jersey relocation law
since D 'Onofrio.151
In an attempt to advance the argument that Staab is unfair to custodial
parents, the Arkansas Supreme Court began its analysis of the New Jersey
cases with a discussion of the 1984 New Jersey Cooper v. Cooper15 2 case,
which was decided eight years after D 'Onofrio.153 Implying that there is a
double standard for relocating parents, the Arkansas Supreme Court referred
the finding in Cooper that a noncustodial parent is free to relocate despite
the fact that his or her children continue to reside in the state from which the
noncustodial parent is relocating. 154 Furthermore, the court found that the
custodial parent could not prevent the noncustodial parent's relocation even
146. 770 A.2d 214, 222 (N.J. 2001).
147. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. at 477, 109 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Baures, 770 A.2d at
222).
148. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 658 ("As our society has become more and more mobile .....
149. 1d. at 476-86, 109 S.W.3d at 657-63.
150. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976). See also discussion supra
Part II1.D.
151. Hollandsworth 1H, 353 Ark. at 476-86, 109 S.W.3d at 657-63. In its examination of
New Jersey relocation law, the Arkansas Supreme Court's argument closely resembled Judge
Bird's concurrence in Hollandsworth 1, 78 Ark. App. 190, 201-09, 79 S.W.3d 856, 863-68
(2002) (Bird, J., concurring). Judge Bird found that the Staab court did not acknowledge the
fact that D 'Onofrio, the case on which the Staab court relied, had since undergone substantial
modifications by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 864-68. Judge Bird dis-
agreed with the fact that the Staab court chose to adopt the law of a New Jersey lower court
that had been since modified by New Jersey's highest court. Id., 79 S.W.3d at 864-68.
152. 491 A.2d 606, 613 (N.J. 1984).
153. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. at 476, 109 S.W.3d at 657.
154. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657-58 (citing Cooper, 491 A.2d at 613).
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though it may disrupt the child's relationship with the noncustodial par-
ent.' 55 The court then cited to D'Onofrio, stating that the custodial parent,
just as the noncustodial parent, is entitled to seek a better life for herself or
himself.'
5 6
Next, the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that the New Jersey cases
have either modified or abrogated D 'Onofrio (upon which Staab relied). 57
The court noted that the 1984 New Jersey Cooper decision reaffirmed
D 'Onofrio in part but also modified New Jersey law.158 The Cooper deci-
sion held that once the custodial parent meets the threshold requirement of
proof that the relocation has a "real advantage" to the custodial parent and
the children, the burden shifts to the noncustodial parent to show that his or
her right to a relationship with the child is unreasonably and adversely af-
fected (unlike the D 'Onofrio analysis in which the burden never shifts to the
noncustodial parent). 59 The Arkansas Supreme Court further emphasized
Cooper's finding that once the burden shifts to the noncustodial parent, he
or she must show more than mere inconvenience to overcome a custodial
parent's right to remove the children. 60 The court then noted that the 1988
New Jersey decision Holder v. Polanski'61 lowered the custodial parent's
threshold requirement from proving a "real advantage" to "any sincere,
good-faith reason."'
162
In conclusion of its examination of New Jersey law, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court mentioned that the 2001 New Jersey Supreme Court ignored
the D 'Onofrio factors and laid out twelve new factors to determine whether
or not to allow removal once the custodial parent has met Holder's "good
faith" threshold requirement. 63 The court then noted that the Baures deci-
sion reiterated the shifting burden analysis found in Cooper, implying that
New Jersey relocation law now contains a shifting burden analysis coupled
with a new factored analysis and therefore no longer adheres to the analysis
set forth in D'Onofrio. 164
155. Id. at 476, 109 S.W.3d at 657-58.
156. Id. at 477, 109 S.W.3d at 658 (citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J.
1976)). The court's reference to this statement out of D'Onofrio did not cite the entire quote,
which included at the end, "provided that the paternal interest can continue to be accommo-
dated." D 'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
157. Hollandsworth I1, 353 Ark. at 480-83, 109 S.W.3d at 660-62.
158. Id. at 476-77, 109 S.W.3d at 657-58.
159. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 657-58.
160. Id. at 481, 109 S.W.3d at 661.
161. 544 A.2d 852 (1988).
162. Hollandsworth II, 353 Ark. at 481, 109 S.W.3d at 661 (citing Holder, 544 A.2d at
852).
163. Id. at 481, 109 S.W.3d at 661 (citing Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214 (1988)).
164. Id. at 483, 109 S.W.3d at 662.
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Additionally, the Arkansas Supreme Court briefly considered the psy-
chological perspective. 165 The court referenced the New Jersey Supreme
Court's finding that social science has generally confirmed that what is
good for the custodial parent is also good for the child.
66
C. The Approach of Other States
The Arkansas Supreme Court next asserted that there is a national
trend of lessening the custodial parent's legal obstacles when desiring to
relocate. 67 The court first stated that "some states that have traditionally
been opposed to custodial-parent relocation have recently adjusted their
criteria to make custodial parent relocation more lenient."'1
68
In support of this national trend, the opinion then cited the various ju-
risdictions that have recently moved in a direction favoring the custodial
parent's right to relocate.169 The opinion notes that Minnesota, in 1983, and
Tennessee, in 1993, held that the custodial parent is presumptively entitled
to relocate. 70 The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that New York, a
jurisdiction that at one time had the toughest laws against custodial parent
relocation, held in 1996 that the court should be free to consider and give
appropriate weight to all of the relevant factors in a best interests of the
child analysis.171 Furthermore, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that Cali-
fornia, Colorado, and Wyoming all recognize the presumptive right of the
custodial parent to relocate. 7 2 Finally, the court noted that Texas and North
Carolina courts have held that relocation will not, in and of itself, establish a
material change of circumstances. 173
D. The Arkansas Cases
Turning to the Arkansas cases, the court pointed out that it "has not
been called upon to consider the accuracy of the Arkansas Court of Ap-
165. Id. at 480, 109 S.W.3d at 660 (citing Baures, 770 A.2d at 214).
166. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 660. The court gave the psychological perspective no further
consideration. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 660.
167. Id. at 478, 109 S.W.3d at 658.
168. Hollandsworth If, 353 Ark. at 478, 109 S.W.3d at 658.
169. Id. at478-480, 109 S.W.3d at 658-61.
170. Id. at 477, 109 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983);
Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1993)).
171. Id. at 478, 109 S.W.3d at 658 (citing Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y.
1996)).
172. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 659 (citing respectively In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473
(Cal. 1996); In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d
1283 (Wyo. 1993)).
173. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 659 (citing Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002);
Gordon v. Gordon, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980)).
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peal's adoption of the criteria established in Staab."' 174 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court then found that Staab was inconsistent with Arkansas prece-
dent. 
75
In support of its argument, the court found that the first prong of the
Staab analysis, which required the custodial parent to prove a "real advan-
tage" of the move, essentially set a presumption that the move was against
the best interests of the child and that presumption is inconsistent with Ar-
kansas precedent. 76 The court found that the first prong of the Staab analy-
sis required the custodial parent to enter court and rebut this presumption
before he or she could retain custody in light of the desired move. 177 It fol-
lows, the court reasoned, that if he or she did not rebut this presumption that
the move was against the best interests of the child, the practical effect is
that he or she will lose custody of the child if he or she chooses to relo-
cate. 178 Put another way, the court reasoned that if the custodial parent pro-
ceeded to relocate even though her relocation petition had been denied, he
or she may not do so with the child and therefore, in a practical sense, cus-
tody would be modified simply because something the custodial parent de-
sired to do was not in the best interests of the child. 79
As such, this scenario would be a modification of custody based on a
best interests of the child standard. 180 This was inconsistent, however, with
the established precedent that custody modification requires meeting a
higher standard than best interests of the child: to modify custody, the mov-
ing party must show that there has been a "material change in circum-
stances," not just conduct a simple best interests of the child analysis. 18' The
court, therefore, found the Staab analysis to be inconsistent with child-
custody modification law. 82 The opinion did acknowledge, without further
discussion, that the Arkansas Court of Appeals has stated that Staab applies
only to the evaluation of relocation petitions, and not child-custody modifi-
cation. 
83
In further support of the argument that Staab was contrary to Arkansas
precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court referred to the 1960 Ising v.
Ward184 holding that the custodial parent is "ordinarily entitled to move to
174. Hollandsworth II, 353 Ark. at 483, 109 S.W.3d at 662.
175. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
176. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
177. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
178. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
179. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
180. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. at 483, 109 S.W.3d at 663.
181. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663 (citing Lloyd v. Butts, 343 Ark. 620, 37 S.W.3d 603 (2001)).
182. Id. at 478, 109 S.W.3d at 663.
183. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663 (citing Riley v. Riley, 45 Ark. App. 165, 873 S.W.2d 564
(1994)).
184. Ising v. Ward, 231 Ark. 767, 332 S.W.2d 495 (1960).
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another state and to take the child to the new domicile."'' 85 The court bol-
stered its argument with reference to the 1954 Antonacci decision, in which
the court stated that it would not require the mother to remain a "prisoner"
in Arkansas. 186 The opinion also cited the 1968 Walter v. Holman'87 case in
which the court noted that after divorce at least one parent must necessarily
forfeit some individual rights to the constant companionship of the chil-
dren. 1
88
E. The Court's Conclusion
Following the examination of the modem mobility of American soci-
ety, New Jersey law's modification and abrogation of D'Onofrio, the mod-
em trend among the states towards a presumptive right to relocate, and the
conflict between Staab and prior-existing Arkansas precedent, the court
announced four new standards applicable to relocation disputes. 189 In pro-
nouncement of the new law, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated the follow-
ing: (1) relocation alone is not a material change of circumstances; (2) the
presumption is in favor of relocation for custodial parents with primary cus-
tody; (3) the burden to rebut that presumption falls on the noncustodial par-
ent; and (4) the custodial parent no longer has to prove a "real advantage" to
herself or himself and to the children in relocating. 190 The court then applied
these new standards to the facts at bar. 191
The court then announced five factors to be taken into consideration in
making a determination of the best interests of the child in a relocation dis-
pute. 92 The factors are as follows: 1) the reason for the relocation; 2) the
educational, health, and leisure opportunities available in the location where
the custodial parent and children will relocate; 3) visitation and communica-
tion schedule for the noncustodial parent; 4) the effect of the move on the
extended family relationships in the location where the custodial parent and
children will relocate, as well as in Arkansas; and 5) preference of the child,
including the age, maturity, and the reasons given by the child as to his or
her preference.1 93
185. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. at 484, 109 S.W.3d at 663.
186. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663; see supra note 68 and accompanying text as to why An-
tonacci is distinguishable from typical relocation disputes.
187. 245 Ark. 173, 431 S.W.2d 468 (1968).
188. Hollandsworth 11, 353 Ark. at 484, 109 S.W.3d at 663 (citing Walter, 245 Ark. at
173, 431 S.W.2d at 468).
189. Id. at 484, 109 S.W.3d at 663-64.
190. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663.
191. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663-64.
192. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663-64.
193. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 663-64.
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In application of these new standards to the facts before it, the court
held that Sheree Hollandsworth's reasons for relocating were valid. 194 Sec-
ond, the court found no detrimental variance in the educational, health, and
leisure opportunities for the children in Tennessee as opposed to Northwest
Arkansas but instead that the children would benefit from the two-parent
home in Tennessee. 95 Third, the court reasoned that because Clarksville,
Tennessee, is "only five-hundred miles away," the noncustodial parent
could have adequate visitation to maintain a respectable relationship with
the children. 196 Fourth, the court acknowledged that the children are sur-
rounded by extended family in Northwest Arkansas and found this to be a
valid consideration.' 97 Ultimately, however, the court stated that Keith, the
father, had failed to establish a "material change in circumstances" and had
failed to meet his burden to rebut the newly adopted presumption in favor of
relocation. 98 The Arkansas Supreme Court thus reversed the trial court's
ruling and held in favor of the mother, Sheree, and thereby allowed her de-
sired relocation with the children to Tennessee. 199
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hol-
landsworth v. Knyzewski 200 is first found in the fact that this case marks only
the second time in the court's history and the first time in forty-three years
(since Ising v. Ward °l) that the Arkansas Supreme Court has directly ad-
dressed relocation law in Arkansas. 20 2 The opinion's ramifications for fam-
ily law practitioners, its generation of several problems, and its creation of
societal dangers further illustrate the significance of this decision. 203 First, it
leaves family law practitioners with confusion as to when to apply Staab.2 °4
Second, Hollandsworth H1 rejected Staab partly on reasoning supported by
the faulty assumption that Staab had the power to modify child-custody.0 5
Third, the decision creates a facially illogical precedent. 20 6 Fourth, the rul-
ing creates a societal danger by potentially exacerbating the noncustodial
194. Hollandsworth II, 353 Ark. at 484, 109 S.W.3d at 664.
195. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
196. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
197. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
198. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
199. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
200. 353 Ark. 470, 109 S.W.3d 653 (2003).
201. Ising v. Ward, 231 Ark. 767, 332 S.W.2d 495 (1960).
202. See supra Part 111.
203. See infra Part V.A-E.
204. See infra Part V.A.
205. See infra Part V.B.
206. See infra Part V.C.
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parent's withdrawal from his or her child's life.207 Fifth, the court fails to
account for the psychological ramifications of its decision.20 8 Finally, the
court could have just as effectively remedied the perceived Staab inconsis-
tency without creating a presumption in favor of the custodial parent's right
to relocate.20 9
A. The Impact on Family Law Practitioners in Arkansas
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court merely declined to use Staab and
did not explicitly overrule the decision, family law practitioners must decide
when, if ever, to employ the Staab analysis. By implication of its reasoning
in Hollandsworth H and less recently in Lewellyn, however, the Arkansas
Supreme Court seems to have answered that question.210 The court has held
that the application of Staab is dependent upon the geographic distance in-
volved in the relocation, not on any disapproval of Staab itself.21 I In Le-
wellyn, the Arkansas Supreme Court found Staab to be irrelevant, holding
that Staab only applies when the facts of the case indicate that relocation
might be made impossible because of the degree of geographical separa-
212tion. In accordance with this view, the court in Hollandsworth II referred
to the relocation as "only five-hundred miles away" and thereby saw no
need to apply the Staab analysis. 21 3 The court, therefore, seems to have an-
swered the question, implying that Staab is applicable only when the geo-
graphic distance is of such a length as to trigger Staab. It follows, then, that
family law practitioners will now have to decide when the geographic dis-
tance is so great as to trigger a Staab analysis instead of using the new
analysis espoused by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Hollandsworth II. At
first glance, the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning seems to answer this
question as well.
The court implied in Hollandsworth II that American society has be-
come so mobile that no distance of relocation would render visitation im-
practical.21 4 Thus, the court has said that Staab is triggered only when the
distance of the move makes visitation impractical and impossible, and be-
cause no distance is impractical because of the increased mobility of Ameri-
can society, Staab is never applicable.
207. See infra Part V.D.
208. See infra Part V.E.
209. See infra Part V.F.
210. See discussion supra Part IlI.E.
211. See disc'_ssion supra Part IlI.E.
212. See Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346,354, 93 S.W.3d 681, 688 (2002).
213. Hollandsworth 1H, 353 Ark. 470, 486, 109 S.W.3d 653, 664 (2003).
214. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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This answer to the practitioner's dilemma seems to overstate the mo-
bility of America's citizenry. The expenses of travel simply do not permit
any and every noncustodial parent to visit his or her child in any part of the
United States where the child might live enough to maintain a healthy rela-
tionship with that child; the Center for Urban Transportation Research has
found, "income is one of the key factors in driving travel demand. ' 21 5 So,
with the economic concern in the picture, the family law practitioner is left
with his or her original question: At what distance does visitation become
impractical or impossible so as to trigger a Staab analysis? This question is
not susceptible to a bright line answer because the distance of impracticality
varies from income to income, person to person, and family to family. The
family law practitioner, therefore, is still left with confusion as to when, if
ever, to apply a Staab analysis.
B. Staab Not as Strong as It Looks
The court rejected Staab partly on reasoning supported by the assump-
tion that Staab was erroneously resulting in child-custody modification and
therefore was inconsistent with existing Arkansas child-custody law. 16 This
reasoning is flawed, however, because the Staab analysis could not legally
result in child-custody modification.
217
The Arkansas Court of Appeals explicitly stated that courts are not to
apply Staab so as to result in child-custody modification."' In Riley, the
appellate court stated that the Staab analysis was never intended to govern
or result in child-custody modification but, rather, was strictly limited to
granting or denying the custodial parent's petition to relocate. 219 Therefore,
to allow a Staab analysis to result in child-custody modification would be a
misapplication of Staab, as the trial court did in this case when it granted
Keith's modification of custody petition.20
The fact that a Staab application can be abused to yield a child-custody
modification does not necessarily make Staab inconsistent with child-
custody law, rather it makes that abused application inconsistent with the
law. The Arkansas Supreme Court mentioned this argument but did not
address it.22 1 The material change in circumstances standard and the Staab
215. Steven E. Polzin et al., The Case for Moderate Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel: A
Critical Juncture in U.S. Travel Behavior Trends, U.S. Dept. of Transportation. at
http://nhts.ornl.gov/2001/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 2003).
216. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
217. See discussion infra Part V.B.
218. Riley v. Riley, 45 Ark. App. 165, 168, 873 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1994).
219. Id., 873 S.W.2dat 567.
220. Hollandsworth 1, 78 Ark. App. 190, 194, 79 S.W.3d 856, 859 (2002).
221. Hollandsworth If, 353 Ark. 470, 484, 109 S.W.3d 653, 663 (2003).
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analysis can therefore exist in harmony because they apply to two different
realms of family law, child-custody modification and relocation requests,
respectively, and the courts should strictly apply those doctrines in accor-
dance with those designations.
C. Not Living in a "Material" World
The announcement that relocation cannot constitute a material change
in circumstances, without providing further explanation, defies common
sense and establishes an unjust and illogical precedent.222 The Arkansas
Supreme Court provided no explanation in Hollandsworth II as to why
moving the children's residence five-hundred miles away from their father
was not a material change in circumstances; the court only stated that the
father could maintain a respectable relationship with his children from that
distance.223 The court did not elaborate on what constitutes a "respectable"
relationship.224
Contrary to the .court's view, relocation is a change in circumstance
that can rise to a level of materiality.225 The American Heritage Dictionary
and Webster's Dictionary respectively define "material" as "relevant ' 226 and
"important." 227 Black's law dictionary defines material as "significant., 228
Relocating to a new city or state cannot properly be classified as an irrele-
vant, unimportant, or insignificant change in one's circumstance, but, rather,
just the opposite. Furthermore, this announcement effectively results in the
conclusion that the custodial parent may now move with the child from Ar-
kansas to California, Hawaii or even Alaska, and the noncustodial parent
may no longer argue that such a move constitutes a material change in cir-
cumstances. While it would be unjust to find every relocation to be a mate-
rial change in circumstance (which would thereby allow a modification of
custody), it seems obvious that some geographic separations of certain
lengths would constitute a material change in circumstances. Thus, the court
should recognize that relocation might very well constitute a material
change in circumstances in some instances.
This announcement is illogical because the practical effect of this an-
nouncement-that relocation can never constitute a material change in cir-
222. See discussion infra Part V.C.
223. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. at 486, 109 S.W.3d at 664.
224. Id., 109 S.W.3d at 664.
225. See discussion infra Part V.C.
226. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 521 (Beth Anderson et al. eds., Dell Publish-
ing 4th ed. 2001).
227. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 382 (Michael Agnes et al.
eds., Macmillan 1996).
228. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 991 (7th ed. 1999).
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cumstances justifying a change in custody-is that the custodial parent can
always move away with the children and the noncustodial parent is, in real-
ity, helpless to stop the move. Even if the court denies a relocation petition,
the custodial parent may still move without losing custody. This announce-
ment effectively renders court decisions on relocation petitions toothless
because it does not really matter, from a custody standpoint, if the court
grants or denies a custodial parent's petition.
If a modification of custody is not a potential consequence of moving
in defiance of a court's relocation determination, what then are the conse-
quences for the custodial parent if he or she relocates in the face of a denied
petition? The court has rightfully established that it would not keep him or
her "prisoner" in the state. This announcement, therefore, relegates reloca-
tion petitions to a formality that is enforceable only by sanctions or fines,
both of which are pale in comparison to the force a relocation petition car-
ries with it when a modification of child-custody may be a consequence of
defying a court's relocation determination.
D. The Societal Danger in Favoring One Parent Over Another
Creating presumptions in favor of the custodial parent generates rami-
fications dangerous to society. Such presumptions potentially reduce the
incentives for noncustodial fathers to remain in their children's lives and,
thereby, contribute to the "deadbeat dad" epidemic.229
Ninety percent of all custodial parents are mothers.23 ° Unfortunately,
sixty-six percent of single custodial mothers receive no financial support
from the noncustodial father of their child.23' At first glance, this statistic
would suggest that the majority of noncustodial fathers are primarily "dead-
beat dads" and thus deserve no leniency in family law. The existence of
such an unfortunate statistic, however, can be explained in three logical
steps and, furthermore, serves to illustrate the societal dangers in the favor-
ing of the custodial mother's rights over those of the noncustodial father.232
First, the creation of the presumption in the Hollandsworth 11 decision
is rationalized in part on the theory that the interests of the child are most
229. See discussion infra Part V.D.
230. Marion Gindes, The Psychological Effects of Relocation for Children of Divorce, 15
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 119, 147 (1998).
231. Jacqueline Pons-Bunney, Non-Custodial Fathers' Rights: State's Lack of Incentives
for the Father to Remain in the Child's Life, 19 J. Juv. L. 212, 221 (1998).
232. For the duration of this subsection, the note will refer to the custodial parent in the
feminine or as mother and the noncustodial parent in the masculine or as father. These asso-
ciations merely reflect the statistic discussed in supra note 215 and not the capabilities of
divorced fathers or mothers to be custodial or noncustodial parents.
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* 233castrongly linked to the interests of the custodial parent. From this it can
logically be inferred that if their interests are most strongly linked, then
what is most important is the relationship between the mother and the
child.234 Placing the highest value on the relationship between the mother
and child, therefore, devalues the relationship between the father and
child.235 Second, legal systems and societies that devalue the relationship
between the noncustodial father and child discourage the father from re-
maining an essential and active part of the child's life.236 Finally, this dis-
couragement intensifies the withdrawal of fathers, thereby contributing in
part to the creation of the unfortunate statistic mentioned above, which finds
that sixty-six percent of single mothers receive no financial support from the
father.237 Theoretically, noncustodial fathers should fulfill their legal duty
without any prompting by the law. The reality, however, is that as the law
treats noncustodial fathers less like a parent and more like a paycheck, sta-
238tistics such as those mentioned above will only worsen.
E. The Neglected Psychological Perspective
Another societal danger created by favoring of the custodial parent's
right to relocate lies in the psychological realm. The Hollandsworth II opin-
ion gave short shrift to the psychological effect relocation has on the child,
only granting such an effect a mere sentence that acknowledged just one
perspective of the social science debate on the topic. 239 Because the court
was making relocation easier for custodial parents and the children that re-
locate with them, the court should have considered in greater depth the psy-
chological consequences of relocation on children.
The opposing view of the social science literature has found that the re-
lationship between the child and the noncustodial father is of equal value
and wholly apart from the relationship between the child and the custodial
mother.24 ° Mental health professionals who regularly conduct custody
233. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. 470, 480, 109 S.W.3d 653, 660 (citing Baures v. Lewis,
770 A.2d 214 (N.J. 2001)).
234. See Frank G. Adams, Child Custody and Parental Relocations: Loving Your Chil-
dren from a Distance, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 143, 150 (1994).
235. Pons-Bunney, supra note 231, at 220. It devalues the father and child relationship
by treating that relationship as less valuable than it previously was when the parents were
married, assuming that the law views the child's relationship with each parent equally when
the parents are married. Id.
236. Id. at 234.
237. Gindes, supra note 230, at 134.
238. See discussion supra Part V.D.
239. Hollandsworth H, 353 Ark. 470, 480, 109 S.W.3d 653, 660 (citing Baures v. Lewis,
770 A.2d 214 (N.J. 2001)).
240. Leben & Moriarty, supra note 2, at 517.
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evaluations have held that the relocation of the child away from the noncus-
todial parent damages the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent
and therefore damages the child.24' The greater the separation between the
noncustodial parent and child, the less involved the noncustodial parent can
be in the child's everyday, ordinary activities.242 As the psychologist Marion
Gindes points out, "being a 'vacation' parent may not be sufficient., 243 To
fail to consider the psychological effects of relocation on children creates a
societal danger, for as the American psychiatrist Karl Menninger concluded,
"What's done to children; they will do to society.'
244
F. Discard the Bathwater, Keep the Baby
The Arkansas Supreme Court could have remedied Staab's purported
inconsistency with child-custody modification law without creating a pre-
sumption in favor of the custodial parent and without going so far as to
make the illogical announcement that relocation cannot constitute a material
change in circumstances. The court could have simply removed the first
prong of the Staab analysis, which required the custodial parent to meet a
threshold burden of proving a "real advantage" of the move. It was this
prong that the court reasoned to be inconsistent with Arkansas precedent.
The court could have then left the factored analysis as a simple balancing
test, free to weigh all the facts of the case without threshold burdens or cus-
todial parent presumptions. A simple balancing test would not, in essence,
set a presumption that relocation is not in the child's best interest. It would
only require the courts to weigh the interests of both parties and the children
and either grant or deny relocation requests on that basis.
As a practical matter, the court should balance the interests of all par-
ties when determining if the custodial parent is entitled to relocate with the
child. If the court denies relocation and the custodial parent moves with the
child anyway, the court should then be allowed to consider the relocation
petition decision and its findings in a child-custody modification case, if the
noncustodial parent chooses to institute such a proceeding. Allowing for
consideration of the relocation decision's findings in the subsequent child-
custody modification proceeding gives relocation decisions some teeth and
yet does not go so far as to grant those decisions the power alone to modify
child custody, the power the court found to be inconsistent with Arkansas
precedent.
241. Terry, supra note 1, at 1016.
242. Gindes, supra note 230, at 135.
243. Id.
244. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 11, at 305.
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G. Conclusion
Relocation cases "present some of the knottiest and most disturbing
problems that ... courts are called upon to resolve., 245 That fact, coupled
with the fact that the Hollandsworth H opinion presents various problems,
indicates that relocation law in Arkansas has not been quieted. As it stands
right now, in accordance with the Hollandsworth H opinion, if the noncus-
todial parent objects to the relocation of the child by the custodial parent, he
or she must enter court and rebut the custodial parent's presumptive right to
relocate. If the noncustodial parent is able to rebut this presumption, the
court will then conduct an analysis under the framework of five factors.
Even if the presumption is rebutted, however, and the five factors weigh in
favor of the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent may still move without
losing custody of the children because of the opinion's announcement that
relocation can never constitute a material change in circumstances.
The Arkansas Supreme Court should have removed the first prong of
the Staab analysis and left relocation determinations as simple balancing
tests without creating a presumption in favor of the custodial parent's right
to relocate. Because relocation disputes are so fact intensive, all the facts of
each case should be free to contribute their appropriate weight to the balanc-
ing of the various interests of the parties. The law should not place these
interests on scales already unbalanced by presumptions. The scales of jus-
tice, if they are to be truly just, should tolerate no such imperfection of
measurement.
The Hollandsworth II decision creates problems and uncertainty for
Arkansas family law practitioners and domestic relations courts and renders
relocation petitions useless through the creation of illogical precedent. 24
6
Furthermore, the creation of the custodial parent's presumptive right engen-
ders dangerous psychological and societal consequences.247 When parents
get a divorce, they divorce each other, not their children. This opinion,
however, deemphasizes the role played by the noncustodial parent in his or
her child's life and, as such, subtly demotes the noncustodial parent from
parent to paycheck.
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